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Preferring not to:The Paradox of Passive
Resistance in Herman Melville’s
“Bartleby”1
Jane Desmarais
“I would prefer not to.”
“You will not?”
“I prefer not.”
1 “Bartleby, the Scrivener” (1853) is a story of passive resistance. And as the narrator is
forced  to  admit,  “Nothing  so  aggravates  an  earnest  person as  a  passive  resistance.”
Refusing to kow-tow to the demands of his employer, and working to his own individual
rule, Bartleby represents a challenge to capitalist, corporatist ideologies. He declines to
do what is asked of him over and above the basic task of copying documents. He is an
unostentatious figure, “pallidly neat, pitiably respectable, incurably forlorn”, who works
“silently, palely, mechanically”, but he exercises enormous power by refusing to comply
with simple and undemanding requests. On the third day of being installed in a legal
office in Wall Street, he is asked by his boss to examine a paper with him, but “without
moving from his privacy”, he replies “I would prefer not to”. Towards the end of the
story, he is discovered occupying the office at weekends. Bartleby’s verbal obstruction
becomes physical.
2 The phrase “prefer not to”,  or what Gilles Deleuze has called the “Formula”,2 recurs
throughout the story and its repetition drives Bartleby’s colleagues to combative fury. In
their simplicity and politeness, these five words -“I would prefer not to”- and the use of
the verb “prefer” most notably - achieve a paradoxical significance within the narrative.
The statement juxtaposes a conditional with a negative sense, and this lends the reply its
force. On the one hand, Bartleby refuses politely, using the conditional form “would”
suggesting that there might be a choice in the matter. On the other hand, this choice and
therefore  expression of  politeness  is  an illusion,  for  Bartleby blatantly  refuses  to  do
anything asked of him. What we witness in the story is a form of resistance based on the
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paradox  of  appearing  to  yield  while  yielding  not  at  all.3 Bartleby’s  politeness  is
browbeatingly powerful, disarming both the reader and the narrator. How could one fault
such a genteel reply? Even when challenged “You will not?” Bartleby counters with a
quiet “I prefer not.” Like the semblance of choice in his response, “prefer” is both illusive
and allusive. Unspecific in what it refers to, the word alludes to a choice which it denies.
The implicit suggestion that there might be something Bartleby would prefer to do is an
illusion.  The  use  of  the  word,  “prefer”,  then,  appears  contradictory  and  strikes  an
ambiguous note in the story. A comparative verb is articulated by Bartleby as an absolute.
The narrator declares that he is “More a man of preferences than assumptions”,  but
Bartleby effectively turns the expression of preference into a statement which has the
force of an assumption. This small verbal paradox is just one of a whole set of tensions
which shape the narrative.4
3 Bartleby’s  loss  of  appetite  and  his  increasingly  pallid  and  deathly  demeanour  offer
valuable clues to our understanding of his character. Bartleby does not like change. “I
would prefer not to make any change” he says,  and a little later states “I  like to be
stationary”. In fact, he prefers not to go very far at all, working, eating, sleeping all in the
same place. He is unable to move out of his private world and make public aspects of
himself. He copies documents, but refuses to compare them for that would mean working
with someone, and his aim is to remain autonomous and self-contained. This neurotic
behaviour is underlined by Bartleby’s anorexic characteristics. Ultimately he refuses to
take in any nourishment, but this is prefigured in the text by his refusing to take on more
work.
4 Melville uses the metaphors of eating and digestion repeatedly. Before Bartleby’s arrival
we are apprised of the alimentary economy of the law office. The work habits of Turkey,
whose “clothes were apt to look oily, and smell of eating houses” complement those of his
colleague, Nippers, whose “brandylike disposition” rendered him irritable for a morning’s
work. In spite of these idiosyncracies, they perform their roles “like guards”. The lawyer-
narrator informs us that he “never had to do with their eccentricities at one time.... When
Nippers’[fit] was on, Turkey’s was off; and vice versa.” Bartleby disrupts this economy.
When he arrives at the office he appears to be breaking some kind of fast:
At first, Bartleby did an extraordinary quantity of writing. As if long famishing for
something to copy, he seemed to gorge himself on my documents. There was no
pause for digestion.
5 He nourishes himself on paperwork to such an extent that he becomes identified with the
document copies, and we might consider the ambiguity in the statement, “I like to be
stationary”.  Bartleby  is  and  is  not  what  he  eats.  He  feeds  on  documents  and  is
“stationery”,  but  in general  he eats  very little.  It  is  not  surprising that  the narrator
observes “he never went out to dinner”.  Bartleby survives on handfuls of gingernuts
which are then consumed alone. The spicy biscuits have no effect on Bartleby’s mild
nature and passivity, unlike the Englishman, Turkey, whose feisty, aggressive behaviour
after a liquid lunch stands in contrast to his subdued efforts in the morning. The contrast
between  Bartleby’s  self-denial  and  the  epicureanism of  the  other  characters,  whose
behaviour is influenced by what they eat and drink, is made explicit. The “energetic”,
“noisy” insolence of Turkey is induced by his noonday tipple, while Nippers, afflicted by
the “two evil powers” of “ambition and indigestion”, is calmed after a good lunch.5 The
twelve-year-old Ginger Nut nibbles throughout the day and one of his duties is as “cake
and apple purveyor” for the other clerks. The word play (stationary/stationery), verbal
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repetition (gingernut/Ginger Nut) and references to food which cannot be eaten (Turkey),
without  implications  of  the  ultimate  taboo,  cannibalism,  create  a  kind  of  linguistic
indigestion at this point in the story, which worsens as Bartleby repeats his refusal, “I
would prefer not to”. The phrase is, we might say, regurgitated, burped, repeated, in the
text, and this calls to mind the impossibility of digestion and satiation for Bartleby. He
refuses, in effect, to be fed, except insofar as he feeds (on) himself.
6 In the course of the story Bartleby concedes a few biscuits and a morsel of cheese, and
accordingly expends little energy. Repeatedly he is described as “motionless”, “sedate”
and “still”. This reliable serenity is described at one point as an attractive feature, but the
narrator  becomes  only  temporarily  “reconciled”  to  Bartleby’s  “unalterableness  of
demeanour”. By refusing to move, take on more work and take in more food, Bartleby
achieves  an  ascetic  purity,  and  this  is  borne  out  by  significant  references  to  his
“hermitage”, a place of silence and solitude for him. By the end of the story, the constant
refusals wear everyone down. Locked away in prison, Bartleby refuses to eat:
'I prefer not to dine today,' said Bartleby, turning away. 'It would disagree with me;
I  am  unused  to  dinners'.  So  saying,  he  slowly  moved  to  the  other  side  of  the
enclosure and took up a position fronting the dead-wall.
7 This is portentous, for the man who “lives without dining”, gives up living. Even in death
-the ultimate defence- Bartleby is mild and courteous. He politely refuses to eat,  and
simply so to live. Curled up, foetus-fashion, he becomes identified with the object against
which his head rests -the prison wall. We are prepared for this early on by references to
his pallid complexion, his withdrawal from social life and refusal to take anything- food,
money and even the offer of human empathy. The emptiness of Bartleby’s life is alluded
to in the paradoxical references to Egypt. There might be a regal dignity to Bartleby’s last
moments, but unlike Egyptian kings, he is buried without sustenance for the afterlife, but
this is appropriate since he is a man without power, appetite or desire.
8 Bartleby’s disengagement from life is not presented as disagreeable. Indeed, his exit is
quiet  and contained.  For  the  time he  survives  he  does  so  on nothing.  He makes  no
demands, and is constantly in the position of reaction. Bartleby does not revolt in terms
of a physical attack, but through a repeated set of verbal refusals, he achieves the effect
of revolt. In anorexic style, he is able to live while taking no nourishment, either physical
or spiritual. His is a quiet battle, concerned less with attack than defence.6 He might be a
small component in the relentless law machine of Wall Street, but he brings significance
and power to his position as a copyist in the office.  The small  man in his small  way
interferes with processes which are repetitive and uncreative.
9 An absent figure in so many ways (he says little,  does little,  is little),  Bartleby has a
powerful  presence,  and we are astonished,  I  think,  at  how so slight  a  character  can
represent, in F.O. Matthiessen’s words, “a tragedy of utter negation” (493). The haunting
reality of Bartleby’s situation is real enough, and his increasing isolation combined with
his  determination  not  to  comply  creates  the  most  intriguing  and  perplexing
psychological profile of passive resistance in nineteenth-century literary history. In 1978,
Q.D. Leavis, declared of “Bartleby” that in spite of “plenty of critical attention... there is
no  disagreement  as  to  its  meaning  and  the  nature  of  its  techniques...  present  no
difficulty”  (199).  This  characteristically  dogmatic  view  is  not  only  outmoded,  but  is
demonstrably inaccurate. The proliferation of critical readings of “Bartleby” testify to the
story’s complexity and significance. Some critics, like Morris Beja, have warned against
an “either/or approach”, but the tendency has been to view the story as either a socio-
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economic parable or a psychological study. This probably accounts for why much of the
critical work on “Bartleby” is disappointing. Some readings overemphasise aspects or
elements of the story at the expense of others. In 1962, when the psycho-critics were
refining their notions of doppelgangers and split selves, Marvin Felheim, in an article in
College English, tried to categorise the various treatments of the story. His categories were
not helpful, but his project highlighted two readings of the story that were particularly
popular.
10 The first, political, reading locates the story within the context of America’s capitalist
expansion. Bartleby refuses to accept the structures imposed on him by a modernising
world interested more in collective strategies and “Yes” men than the individual seeking
to live outside mainstream ideals. The lawyer-narrator’s chambers become, so to speak,
Everyoffice. Bartleby becomes the archetypal clerk, a figure bowed to his task and of
whom  it  is  demanded  absolute  compliance  and  reliability.  His  preference  “not  to”
becomes the insistent and impeccable articulation of resistance in the wilderness called
Modern America. He fights by refusing to fight and so he has become an icon for various
Peace Movements in the twentieth century. Thus “Bartleby” is an allegory of modern
America and the failure of democracy to preserve the individual’s right and freedom to
choose. It is a story about the failure of modern social life. It is also the story of political
unrootedness, of the consequences of living in a society operating at an alienatingly high
level of production and consumption.
11 It is not surprising that many critics sought to locate the source of this political reading
in the writings of H.D. Thoreau. As Michael Paul Rogin comments in Subversive Genealogy,
although Bartleby’s “I prefer not to” is an echo of Thoreau’s “I simply wish to refuse
allegiance, to withdraw”, it is not a straightforward debt to the author of Walden. Rather,
Melville’s tale inverts Thoreau’s notion of passive resistance. Thoreau went to jail for not
paying his poll-tax (because it contributed to slavery), but unlike Bartleby whose sense of
self is dramatically reduced by confinement, Thoreau felt that to be physically immured
was not to lose his sense of personal civic liberty:
I saw that, if there was a wall of stone between me and my townsmen, there was a
still more difficult one to climb or break through, before they could get to be as free
as I was. I did not for a moment feel confined, and the walls seemed a great waste of
stone and mortar.
12 In Thoreau’s confinement, he retains the idea that he is “free”, and he goes on to say that
imprisonment is  a mere physical  restriction.  He insists that a part of  him cannot be
imprisoned and this resistance has no cost because it is not part of the civil or political
domain. Confinement in his view does not inhibit a man’s sense of his own intellectual or
moral worth. “I was not born to be forced”, Thoreau insists, “I will breathe after my own
fashion.” His sacrifice is never more than partial because his virtue has only to be civic or
public. In fact, his psychological freedom could even be thought of having been enhanced
by his corporeal imprisonment. This is not the case for Bartleby, however, whose sacrifice
is so much the greater because these binary divisions are abandoned. After Bartleby is en-
Tombed,7 his  withdrawal  is  severe,  and  this  leads  to  his  self-destruction.  This  is
paradoxical and inverts the whole notion of defence which is to keep out the dangerous
object: “Hence what was designed in the first instance as a guard or barrier to prevent
disruptive impingement on the self, can become the walls of a prison from which the self
cannot escape” (Laing 150). At the end of the story Bartleby walls himself out of his own
life, and he thereby destroys himself while conserving others. The denial of others, for
Bartleby, necessarily involves self-denial and withdrawal, and the punishment of himself.
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This takes us a long way from the political ideal of passive resistance, behind which the
idea is to “save the adversary as well as to triumph over him” (Rogin 195), and brings us
closer to a psychological reading.
13 The psychological reading presents a more disturbing view. Bartleby’s lifelessness is both
the product and outcome of a sterile bureaucracy which as an external reality has little to
do with the natural impulses and desires of the individual. This reading offers an image of
neurotic  vulnerability.  Such  is  the  incurable  isolation  of  individuals  whose  personal
histories  are  lost  in  and  to  the  System.  Desks  and  chairs  may  be  repositioned  and
partition doors may fold down, but there is little change or hope for the individual like
Bartleby whose internally-constructed walls are more impermeable than any person can
understand. His elegant and economical “I would prefer not to” becomes the mantra of
the  dispossessed  and  unlocated.  It  becomes  another  wall  between  him and  external
reality.
14 Both readings have their merits, but are often presented as mutually exclusive; whereas
the  political-allegorical  reading  hails  Bartleby  as  a  hero,  the  psychological  spin
demonstrates  the ways  in which he fails.  Might  there be  a  way of  transcending the
distinction  between  a  political  and  a  psychological  reading?  Might  there  be  an
alternative, paradoxical, reading of the text, which puts the psychology at the heart of
the politics rather than treating them as discrete? The language of anorexia is helpful
here,  because,  as  an  illness  with  which  we  are  becoming  increasingly  familiar,  that
condition operates  extremely successfully  as  a  form of  resistance.  The nature of  the
resistance,  however,  is  paradoxical  and  tragic.  In  many  cases,  as  in  Bartleby’s,  it  is
withdrawal  in  extremis,  a  slow suicide.  By  keeping everything and everyone out,  the
anorexic is able to achieve a state of ascetic purity, but this purity leads ultimately to
death and is quite literally short-lived. When Bartleby is at his most resistant, the office
becomes his “hermitage”. He changes working space into a space of retreat, as he does
with his own inner life. As many studies show, anorexics prefer to retreat from social life
and seek out places of silence and solitude, where they are able to regulate meagre meals
and live on virtually nothing. This is how the narrator describes Bartleby’s routine. The
paradoxical  nature  of  anorexic  behaviour,  the  diligence  and  energy  involved  in  not
eating,  in not  consuming,  in not  complying,  is  also represented in Melville’s  text  by
character of Bartleby and his recurring phrase, “I would prefer not to”. As I explained
earlier, the force of this refusal derives from the way in which the comparative statement
is turned into an absolute. At a social and political level, this mode of resistance is highly
effective,  and capable  of  undermining oppressive  governments  and military  regimes.
When adopted by the individual, the consequences can be self-destructive. Melville offers
both possible outcomes in “Bartleby” and by so doing reveals the contingent nature of the
distinction between private and public realms and thus of denial.
15 It would be a mistake to treat Bartleby as a case study of anorexia, as it has been to see
him simply as a schizophrenic with various compulsion neuroses. Although some early
critics have identified Bartleby with Melville himself (Mumford 238), Bartleby is a literary
construct, and provides only an abstract version of a psychological case study. However,
the paradoxical condition of anorexia is a useful model in analysing the complexity of
Melville’s characterisation, and is suggested by the metaphors of feasting and fasting, the
recurring statement “I would prefer not to”, and also by what Leo Marx has called the
“controlling symbols of the story”: the walls.
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16 In his study of the relationship between Melville’s politics and art, Rogin makes reference
to the various walls in the text. He describes the way in which Bartleby is confined in his
work, screened and “bounded” by a “white wall” at one end and a “lofty brick wall” at the
other, and the way in which he withdraws to “dead-wall reveries” when he is sick of
copying. And Wall Street, of course, provides the appropriate backdrop. More concerned
with the political resonances of Bartleby’s character for Melville, Rogin merely alludes to
the psychological significance of these walls. He refers to them in the mode of leitmotifs,
as  boundaries,  partitions,  parameters,  which  create  the  idea  of  isolation  and  the
breakdown of “rooted relationships” (194). Bartleby, according to Rogin, is a cog in the
political machine; he is “Tocqueville’s democratic individual, cut off from family, class,
and community” (196).  This is a useful reading but it does not take into account the
screen and the  walls  within walls  which  constitute  Bartleby’s  paradoxical  and  tragic
condition.
17 A wall is defined as a structure which defends, holds back, fortifies, encloses, and by its
very nature, separates and divides. In “Bartleby”, there are two kinds of wall: the physical
boundaries  of  Wall  Street,  the  law  offices  and  the  internal  partitions,  and  the
psychological walls which Bartleby erects in order to defend himself from entreaties to
change. He says to the lawyer-narrator, “I like to be stationary. But I am not particular”.8
As long as he can stay in one place, he is content and quite literally “contained”. The walls
which surround him give him a sense of place if  not identity,  and there is a certain
security in this.  These external  and inner walls  are of  course interrelated.  Bartleby’s
physical environment metaphorically figures his psychological barricades. The lawyer’s
office is  a walled block surrounded by walls.  At one end there is  light afforded by a
“spacious skylight shaft”; at the other, there is the “everlasting shade” of a “lofty brick
wall, black by age... which... required no spyglass to bring out its lurking beauties, but, for
the  benefit  of  all  nearsighted  spectators,  was  pushed  up  to  within  ten  feet  of  my
windowpanes.” The narrator adds, “the interval between this wall and mine not a little
resembled a huge square cistern.” Bartleby’s working space is further defined by a wall
three feet away and a “high green folding screen” which demarcates his space from that
of his boss: “And thus, in a manner, privacy and society were conjoined.” Bartleby’s space
therefore is rather like a series of boxes placed one inside the other, the smallest box
being the internal walled area within Bartleby himself, which keeps others out and keeps
him inside. This is most powerfully conveyed when he refuses to admit the lawyer to his
own offices, thus displacing and reducing him to walking “around the block two or three
times”.  The  complexity  of  this  situation  surely  recalls  Thoreau’s  “Essay  on  Civil
Disobedience” and the idea that the psychological part of man cannot be imprisoned
because it is not part of the civil or political domain.
18 It is interesting that the serialised version of the story first appeared in Putnam’s Magazine
in two parts. Part One ends with the lawyer’s decision to try and cope with the scrivener’s
announcement  that  he  has  given  up  copying.  Part  Two  opens  with  a  role  reversal.
Bartleby is inside the office; the lawyer-narrator is refused entry. The ec-centric Bartleby
occupies the central space and his patron is forced to find alternative accommodation.
Part  One  treats  the  themes  of  displacement  and social  alienation whereas  Part  Two
focuses more on the notions of self-alienation and self-division, from which both Bartleby
and the lawyer suffer.9 We might remind ourselves here of R.D. Laing’s 1959 existentialist
study, The Divided Self, which, as Morris Beja has noted, is highly suggestive in reading
Melville. In Laingian terms, Bartleby and the lawyer are divided selves. They are “cut off
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from others and from the world, but also self-divided, dissociated” (Beja 559). Bartleby’s
self-dissociation, however, has damaging consequences. He becomes “petrified”. He turns
from an alive person into a dead thing, into a stone, or wall. Laing describes this as the
schizoid’s  adoption  of  various  paradoxical  forms  of  self-protection,  and  terms it
“petrification”:
If the whole of the individual’s being cannot be defended, the individual retracts his
lines of defence until he withdraws within a central citadel. He is prepared to write
off everything he is, except his “self”. But the tragic paradox is that the more the
self is defended in this way, the more it is destroyed (80-1).
19 As Laing remarks this can be a strategy adopted by all  types of  person,  not just the
“unembodied” schizoid personality, and in Melville’s story the line between sanity and
madness is shown to be thin. “Normal” behaviour is behaviour which fits in with the
majority view. Those, like Bartleby, who do not measure up, are “luny” and “deranged”,
and their defence becomes one of self-ostracisation and petrification.
20 While  Laing’s  work  provides  real  insight  into  the  “unembodied”  character  of  the
scrivener,  recent  psychoanalytical  studies  of  eating  disorders  (such  as  bulimia  and
anorexia)  provide  a  more  sophisticated  psychological  model.10 Some  research,  most
notably,  that of L.K.G.  Hus,  E.S.  Meltzer and A.H. Crisp,  bridges understanding of the
disorders of schizophrenia and anorexia nervosa11 and, more recently, Gianna Williams’
model of a “No Entry” system of defences, developed from the theories of Melanie Klein
and Wilfred Bion, provides a way of understanding the character of Bartleby and his
series of refusals. In her book, Internal Landscapes and Foreign Bodies (1997), she touches on
“a range of feeding difficulties or eating disorders which may be seen as further facets of
the pathology associated with impairments in ‘taking from another’” (11). Drawing on the
lives of “patients who protect themselves from the experience of an inimical input” (12),
Williams describes the ways in which keeping everyone and everything out  becomes
paramount for the anorexic/bulimic in particular:
I think it becomes clear ... that the relinquishment of defences against forming a
dependent relationship on a human being, free to come and go ... represents a shift
especially in the area of eating disorders,  from valuing possessions to valuing a
different aspect in one’s quality of life. It could probably be most concisely defined
as a transition from lending value to having,  to finding greater fulfilment in the
more painful but richer predicament of being (13-14).
21 Bartleby does not make this transition, because he cannot move beyond a state of self-
denial. In order to be he would have to dissolve some of the boundaries and walls and
admit (in both senses of the word) assistance (and existence). He is concerned most of all
to  protect himself  from  invasion.  His  invasion  anxieties  are  not  circumscribed,  but
manifest themselves variously as refusals to take food in, to take work on, to admit the
need of help, and to allow others access (into either a physical or psychological space).
Most pertinently in the story they manifest themselves as refusals of nourishment. In
Williams’ terms, these refusals constitute a “no-entry” syndrome which “performs the
defensive function of blocking access to any input experienced as potentially intrusive
and persecutory” (121). Bartleby constructs a chinese box of walls, and, paradoxically,
this is both a gesture towards life and death.
22 This  “no-entry”  syndrome is  psychological  stoicism and  we  should  recall  by  way  of
conclusion Melville’s references to Cicero - a re-presentation of reason, eloquence and
stoicism. We encounter the bust first of all through the eyes of the lawyer-narrator, who
remarks  that  “doubtless  I  should  have  violently  dismissed  him  [Bartleby]  from  the
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premises. But as it was I should have as soon thought of turning my pale plaster-of-Paris
bust of Cicero out of doors.” A little later on, Bartleby fixates on the head. He declares
that he preferred not to examine the fourth quadruplicate, but instead “kept his glance
fixed upon [the] bust of Cicero”. Through the suggestive double appearance of the bust in
the text, Melville is able to adopt into “Bartleby” both the political and psychological
notions of stoicism, which becomes a way, as I hope to have shown, of setting up the
problem of Bartleby’s retreat from the public world and his self-denial. Using political
thought  as  well  as  psychology in our reading of  the text  allows us  to overcome the
dichotomy in the critical literature. In the end, because the story of Bartleby is a “tragic
paradox”  in  psychological  terms  it  must  be  a  “tragic  paradox”  in  political  terms.
Bartleby’s freedoms are incompatible with life.
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NOTES
1.  My thanks to Michael Brearley, Joseph Holt, Matthew Pountney and John Shaw for helping to
shape my own dead-wall reveries.
2.  Deleuze uses this term in “Bartleby; Or, The Formula”, in Essays Critical and Clinical, which was
first published in 1993, and brings together his essays on a variety of writers and philosophers.
To “Bartleby”, as to the other essays, Deleuze adopts a ‘symptomatological’ approach, diagnosing
the ways in which language, pushed to and beyond its own limits, represents the process of life
itself. He writes:
The  formula  bourgeons  and  proliferates.  At  each  occurrence,  there  is  a  stupor  surrounding
Bartleby, as if one had heard the Unspeakable or the Unstoppable. And there is Bartleby’s silence,
as if he had said everything and exhausted language at the same time. With each instance, one
has the impression that the madness is growing: not Bartleby’s madness in “particular”, but the
madness around him, notably that of the attorney, who launches into strange propositions and
even stranger behaviours.
3.  The affirmative  and negative  nature  of  Bartleby’s  “preferring  not  to”  has  been noted by
Jaworski: Bartleby “does not refuse, but neither does he accept, he advances and then withdraws
into this advance, barely exposing himself in a nimble retreat from speech” (19).
4.  Apart from Deleuze no critic has bothered to unpack this statement. In Bartleby in Manhattan
and Other Essays, Elizabeth Hardwick writes tentatively: “I do not think he has chosen the verb
‘prefer’ in some emblematic way. That is his language and his language is what he is. Prefer has
its power, however” (224). With which last sentiment I concur. The phrase is mobilised by the
other  characters  too,  who,  described  by  the  lawyer-narrator  as  having  “got  the  word”,
involuntarily “roll it from their tongues” [p.20].
5.  Epicureanism involves an appreciation of the centrality of pleasure, especially consumption,
for the good life. Acknowledging this in the story gives Nippers and Turkey (and by extension
Ginger Nut and the grubman), a philosophical meaning of their own. Are they epicureans, or, do
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they  reveal  the  problems  encountered  by  the  other  side  of  the  argument?  Whatever,
epicureanism does have the virtue of making food a necessary element in the story rather than
the metaphorical  object  of  denial  in the narrow political  reading.  That is,  seeing stoicism in
dialogue with epicureanism makes food the necessary dramatic heart of a broader reading since
epicureanism necessarily emphasises consumption.
6.  Deleuze  describes  the  quiet,  dignified,  “agrammatical”  Bartleby  as  a  modern Messiah:  “A
schizophrenic vocation: even in his catatonic or anorexic state, Bartleby is not the patient, but
the doctor of a sick America, the Medicine-Man, the new Christ or the brother to us all” (90).
7.  The “Tombs” are the so-called Hall of Justice in downtown Manhattan used mainly as a prison.
8.  This is part of the same lexical paradox as “prefer” for he is not “particular” as long as he gets
what he wants.
9.  See, for example, the literature on “doubling” in Melville: Marcus, “Melville’s Bartleby as a
Psychological Double” 365-8; Widmer pp.112f.; Rogers pp.67-70; Keppler pp.115-20.
10.  Two recent and particularly useful studies are Farrell (1995) and Lawrence (1995).
11.  See the work of Hus, Meltzer and Crisp.
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